Check your SPF, DKIM and DMARC records
Three DNS records decide how easily somebody can send email that appears to come from your domain. The free check reads them from public DNS, in about ten seconds, and tells you what they actually allow rather than what you hoped they said.
Run my free security checkabout 10 seconds, no account needed
This matters more for small businesses than most people expect. Invoice fraud almost always starts with an email that looks like it came from a real supplier, and a domain with no SPF, DKIM or DMARC records is the easiest kind to imitate.
Email records are one of about a dozen areas in the same scan, so you get them alongside your certificate, headers, reputation and exposed files, all in one A to E grade.
What the email check reads
Everything here comes from public DNS, the same records any receiving mail server looks up when a message claiming to be from you arrives. We do not connect to your mailbox, read any mail, or send test messages.
- Your SPF record, which lists the servers allowed to send email for your domain, and how strictly it ends.
- Your DMARC record, which tells receiving servers what to do when a message fails those checks, and whether anyone is being sent the reports.
- DKIM signing, the cryptographic signature that proves a message really came from your domain and was not altered on the way.
- Obvious contradictions, such as more than one SPF record, which causes SPF to fail outright rather than fall back gracefully.
The result is reported the same way as everything else in the scan: what was found, why it matters, and what to change.
What the three records actually do
They are often talked about as one thing. They are three separate jobs, and you need all three before the protection is real.
| Record | What it does | What a good answer looks like |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | Publishes the list of servers permitted to send email for your domain, so a receiving server can tell whether a message came from one of them. | One record, listing every service you actually send from, ending in -all or at least ~all. |
| DKIM | Signs each outgoing message with a key published in your DNS, so the receiving server can prove the message was not forged or altered in transit. | A published key for every service that sends on your behalf, not just your main mailbox provider. |
| DMARC | Ties the other two together: it tells receiving servers what to do when a message fails, and where to send reports about it. | A record that eventually reaches p=quarantine or p=reject, with a reporting address. |
SPF and DKIM describe what is legitimate. DMARC is the only one of the three that asks anyone to act on it.
What your result means
The findings we see most often, and what each one really costs you:
- No SPF record at all. Nothing stops anyone anywhere from sending email as your domain. This is still surprisingly common on small business domains.
- An SPF record ending +all. It publishes that every server on the internet is authorised. That is worse than having no record, because it looks configured.
- More than one SPF record. The specification allows exactly one. Two records mean SPF fails for everyone, and it usually happens when a new mail service is added without editing the existing record.
- No DMARC record. SPF and DKIM may both be in place, but nothing tells receiving servers to do anything when a message fails them, so forged mail still lands.
- DMARC on p=none. Monitoring only. This is the correct place to start and the wrong place to stop, and it is where the majority of domains sit indefinitely.
- DKIM missing for a service you use. Newsletters, invoicing tools and CRMs each need their own key. Messages from those usually fail alignment while your ordinary mail passes.
If you only change one thing: a DMARC record left on p=none is telling the world your domain can be impersonated with no consequences. Moving it to quarantine, once you know your own mail passes, is the change that actually stops the forgeries.
Getting to records that protect you
The order matters, because moving too fast is the one way to break legitimate mail. A careful run through takes a few weeks of mostly waiting.
- Write down everything that sends email as you. Mail provider, website contact forms, invoicing software, newsletter tool, booking system, CRM. This list is always longer than people expect, and anything you miss is what breaks later.
- Publish one SPF record covering all of them. One record, not several.
- Turn on DKIM in each service and publish the key it gives you. Most providers have a one-click option and then a DNS record to add.
- Add DMARC on p=none with a reporting address, and leave it there for a few weeks. It changes nothing about delivery, and the reports tell you which of your own senders are failing.
- Fix what the reports show, then move to p=quarantine, then to p=reject when a week of quarantine passes without complaints.
Setting up SPF and DMARC walks through each record with the values to use, and how to check if your domain can be spoofed explains how to test the result honestly.
Once email authentication is sorted, MTA-STS is the sensible next step. It governs encryption in transit rather than spoofing, so it is a separate job and not part of this check.
What the check does not do
- It does not read, receive or send any email. Public DNS records only.
- It does not tell you whether a particular message that reached your inbox was genuine. That is a question about one message, not about your domain.
- It cannot stop a look-alike domain. DMARC protects your exact domain, so someone registering a near-miss spelling is a different problem, and one no DNS record solves.
- It does not check whether your sending IP address sits on a mail blocklist such as Spamhaus. That is about deliverability rather than spoofing, and needs a tool built for it.
- It does not read your DMARC reports for you. There are dedicated services for that, and for a small business the free tier of one is usually enough.
Common questions
How do I check if my domain has SPF and DMARC?
Run the free security check on your web address and the email records come back with the rest of the report in about ten seconds. The records are published in public DNS, so no access to your mailbox or hosting is needed.
What is a DMARC record?
It is a DNS record that tells receiving mail servers what to do with a message that claims to be from your domain but fails SPF and DKIM. It can ask them to do nothing (p=none), to treat the message as suspicious (p=quarantine), or to refuse it outright (p=reject). It also names an address that should receive reports about the failures.
Can I have two SPF records?
No. The standard allows exactly one SPF record per domain, and publishing two makes SPF fail rather than combine. When you add a new sending service, extend the record you already have instead of adding a second one.
Is p=none enough?
No. It is the right starting point, because it lets you collect reports without risking legitimate mail, but on its own it asks nobody to do anything. A domain sitting on p=none is still trivially easy to impersonate. The value only arrives at quarantine or reject.
Will DMARC stop all email spoofing?
It stops messages that use your exact domain, which is the common and most convincing kind. It cannot do anything about a look-alike domain registered by someone else, or a display name in someone's mail client that simply says your company name. Those need people to notice, not DNS.
Does this check my mail server or my inbox?
Neither. It reads public DNS records for your domain, the same way any receiving mail server does. We never connect to a mailbox, and we never send test messages to or from your domain.